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SERVICE OF PROCESS
This topic, like that of courts and jurisdiction, covers much
territory. So, again only those phases bearing upon the average case will be highlighted. One should be familiar with Code
Sections 10-401 to 10-473 and their annotations, as this subject is purely statutory.1
A summons is necessary to obtain jurisdiction of a defendant in an action under the mandatory provisions of Section
10-401, and though such provisions must be strictly complied
with, as regards the original summons, the same strictness
is not applicable to the copy wherein for example, the name
of the defendant in the title appeared as "J. F. Storfer", while
on the back it was "S. J. Storfer". As said in Lee v. Storfer
(1930), 159 S. C. 70, 156 S. E. 177, at page 74:
In Heywardt v. Williams, 48 S. C., 564, 26 S. E., 797,
798, speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Jones said: 'The
whole spirit of the Code is opposed to the disposition of
a cause upon mere technical errors and irregularities, and
seeks a fair hearing on the merits; hence the very ample
powers of amendment conferred on the trial Courts.'
Speaking of the process by which a defendant is
brought within the jurisdiction of the Court, Cyc. says
this: 'The copy should be substantially correct, but is
not to be construed with the same strictness as the original. The copy need not contain any endorsement by the
Sheriff, but is sufficient if it contains all that was put
on the summons by the Clerk. Clerical errors in the copy
delivered will not affect the jurisdiction of the Court,
where defendant has not been misled thereby.' 32 Cyc.,
459.
The name of a person is something by which to identify
him. The defendant in this case was sufficiently identified to bring him into the Court as 'S. J. Storfer,' the
defendant named in the original summons. The objection
made to the service was entirely technical, and the tendency of the Courts is now properly in the direction of
disregarding mere technicalities.
There is but one exception to the necessity of using a summons and that is where the Supreme Court in its original

1. All Code Sections mentioned in this volume refer to the 1952 Code.
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jurisdiction issues a rule to show cause. Dacus v. Johnston
(1936), 180 S. C. 329, 185 S. E. 491. The exception would
apply to all the common law extraordinary writs. In this connection it should be noted that the writ of quo warranto has
been abolished in this state and has been replaced by a civil
action, therefore a summons is now an indispensable requisite
when bringing such an action and a rule to show cause cannot
be used. State v. Tollison (1913), 95 S. C. 58, 78 S. E. 521.
These writs are provided for in the South Carolina Constitution as follows: Art. 5, Secs. 4, 15, and 31, and Art. 17, Sec.
11. In such common law writs there was an order or rule to
show cause. Such a writ had to be served in a manner which
would give "substantial notice" to the person affected. It was
a proceeding, not an action. Not being.the latter, Sec. 10-401
doesn't apply, and as there is no statute in this State on this
particular phase a summons would not be necessary, but the
order or rule to show cause would have to be served as at
common law. For example, see Mandamus, 38 C. J., Sees. 644
to 667.
The opinion in Easier v. Maybank, Governor, (1939), 191
S. C. 511, 5 S.E. 2d 288, which concerned a writ of mandamus
used confusing phraseology when referring to the proceeding as "By permission this action was commenced in the original jurisdiction of the Court seeking a writ of mandamus
directed to Honorable Burnet R. Maybank, as Governor of the
State of South Carolina to compel him to order and election.
..... " If it were strictly an "action", a summons would have
been necessary under Sec. 10401. But since it was a proceeding having to do with a writ "directed" to the Governor to
"compel him" to do an act, it was in the nature of a rule to
show cause and as such no statutory summons would be required.
In Doty v. Reed, Sheriff, (1948), 212 S. C. 231, 47 S.E. 2d
451, involving mandamus, the respondent claimed that the
petition showed that the petitioner was asking for damages
against the sheriff and that therefore it was an action at law
which required that the service be by a summons. Notice
had been given the sheriff by a rule to show cause. The
Court declared at page 236 as follows:
"The petition herein not having alleged facts from which
an inference could be drawn that petitioner had suffered
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ascertainable monetary damages by reason of the breach
of duty by the respondent, and the present proceeding
being ancillary to the main cause, and the respondent as
an officer of the Court not being a third party in the
ordinary sense, a summons was unnecessary."
However, it should be noted that the Doty case does not directly say what notice or kind of process is necessary as to the
service of writs. One can only arrive at a conclusion by inference, which is not very helpful in ascertaining a rule of
law. Additional matter concerning these writs will be found
later on in this volume.
A defendant may waive an entire want of process esperially when he makes a general appearance and answers on
the merits. Beard-Laney, Inc. v. Darby (1946), 208 S. C. 313,
B8 S. E. 2d 1, declares at page 316:
Section 427 Code of 1942, [now Sec. 10-401, Code 1952]

requires that a civil action 'shall be commended by service
of a summons'. Sections 428 and 429 prescribe the requisites of a summons and state that it shall be 'subscribed
by the plaintiff or his attorney'. Hence the present action
should have been commenced by the service of a summons
and defendants should have been allowed twenty days in
which to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint
But this was not the only means by which the Court
could acquire jurisdiction of defendants. The members
of the Public Service Commission, who were the only defendants at this stage of the proceeding, accepted service
of the rule to show cause and complaint, raised no jurisdictional objection, and filed an answer. By making a
general appearance and answering on the merits these defendants waived not only all defects and irregularities
in the process, but also an entire want of process....
However, the foregoing ruling must, it now appears, be
taken in connection with that in the more recent case of State
Highway Dept. v. Isthmian S. S. Co. (1947), 210 S. C. 408,
43 S. E. 2d 132, wherein at page 416 it is declared:
As stated, it is also the established rule of other jurisdictions, without the aid of statute, that general appearance for any purpose before disposition of objection to
jurisdiction of the person waives the latter objection
even when it is expressly attempted to be reserved, as
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here (except reservation was not attempted here in the
motion for leave to amend the answer). It is the substance of the act and not the form or language which
counts. [Authorities cited]....
And on page 418 there is added:
....
Respondent's motion to dismiss on the merits, answer and motion to amend the latter, all going to the
merits, were made during the pendency of the objection
to jurisdiction and before decision upon it. The inconsistency is patent; respondent in one breath denied the
jurisdiction of the court and in the next sought relief
from it consistent only with the court's jurisdiction of
the action. Waiver arises from such inconsistency. A
general appearance is implied. 3 Am. Jur. 787 et seq.;
6 C. J. S., Appearances, § 13, p. 42. It is different, of
course, after adverse decision upon a jurisdictional objection. No inconsistency arises then from pleading to
the merits; and that is the condition in which our cited
statutes carefully protect the rights of a defendant.
In this connection it should be noted that, when a motion
is made to dismiss a case or proceeding on the sole ground that
the court lacks jurisdiction, and the motion is refused, the
defendant may give notice that he thereby reserves his rights
as to lack of jurisdiction. In such event he may answer or
contest upon the merits and there will be no implied waiver
of the objection to the jurisdiction. Sections 10-648 to 10-651.
102 S. E. 2d 368.
S. C. -,
See Williams v. Ray (1958), Service of Summons:
The summons, with the requisites prescribed in Section
10402, when properly served is deemed to have given the
court jurisdiction from the time of such service. Of course,
there should be proof of service as required by Section 10-407.
However, the entire absence in the record of such proof is
mot conclusive of no such service. Indeed, the introduction
of the judgment roll carries with it the conclusive presumption that there was proper proof of service before the court,
or it would not have rendered the judgment. And this presumption continues until the judgment is set aside in a direct
proceeding for that purpose, Abraham v. N. Y. Underwriters
Ins. Co. (1938), 187 S. C. 70, 196 S. E. 531. As held therein
at page 74:
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'In the first of these two cases the Court says specifically that the mode of proof of service is a mere question
of practice,' "and subordinate to the jurisdictional fact
that such service was duly made." It is the actual service
and the actual residence that determines the jurisdiction
of the person, not the proof by which these conditions
of jurisdiction are made to appear.'
And further on page 75:
'Even in cases where the record shows no proof of
service at all, and therefore shows no compliance with
any of the provisions of Section 440 of the Code, the
Supreme Court has held that the judgment is not subject
to attack, especially after a lapse of several years, and
that every necessary presumption respecting the service
'of process will be invoked to sustain the judgment. [Cases
cited].
When Service Upon Person Not Necessary: There are situations in which service of a summons upon a person is not
necessary. An up-to-date illustration concerns automobiles
which have caused damage. Under Section 45-551 an action
in rem through attachment can be brought against the vehicle
without personal service on anyone. As said in Williams v.
Garlington et al. (1924), 131 S.C. 289, 127 S.E. 20, at page
293:
...
'This is the distinction between an action in personam and an action in rem. In an action 'in rem,' a valid
judgment may be obtained so far as it affects the res
without personal service of process; while in an action

to recover a judgment 'in personam' process must be personally served, or there must be a personal or authorized
appearance in the action.' White v. 'Glover, 138 App.
Div., 797; 123 N. Y. S., 482.
'It is a distinguishing peculiarity of a proceeding in
rem that the jurisdiction of the Court, in the particular
case, rests merely upon the seizure or attachment of the
property. No personal notice to any individual is required. The res, being brought within the jurisdiction
of the Court, becomes subject to its adjudication, and all
parties interested are supposed to be duly appraised of
the proceedings by the mere taking of the property, or
by the usual proclamation or published notice... '
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See also Tolbert v. Buick Car (1927), 142 S. C.362, 140
S. E. 693.
Statutory Service, When Exclusive; When Not:
Under Sections 37-105 and 10-425 the legislature has prescribed an exclusive method of service as to insurance companies and fraternal benefit associations. As said in Mobley
v. Bland & Penn. Cas. Co. (1942), 200 S. C. 448, 21 S. E.
2d 22 at page 454, regarding Section 7964, 1932 Code which
had similar language:
The Lipe case, which did not involve a foreign insurance company, was, in our opinion, quite properly governed by Section 826 of our Code, for it dealt with a foreign corporation which was other than a foreign insurance company, and therefore is entirely distinguishable
from the case now under consideration. Furthermore, the
Lipe case was decided in the year 1923. Even if it should
contain any implication that the manner of service, proper
in that case, should apply here, such implication is overcome by the far more recent case of Murray v. Sovereign
Camp, W. 0. W., 192 S. C., 101, 5 S. E. (2d), 560, which
was decided by this Court sixteen years thereafter in the
year 1939. We quote from page 108 of that opinion in
192 S. C., page 562 of 5 S. E. (2d) : "We hold, therefore
* * * that service on foreign insurance companies as provided for in Section 7964 of the Code of 1932 is exclusive,
and that ssrvice made in any other way upon such corporations is invalid....

Of course, where a statute says "may" instead of "shall",
as does Section 10-430 relative to motor vehicle carriers and
Section 10-433 relative to nonresident individual fiduciaries,
such service is not exclusive. See Muckenfuss v. So. Transportation, Inc. (1944), 204 S. C. 369 at page 372, 29 S. E. 2d 486.
In Murray v. Sovereign Camp W. 0. W. (1939), 192 S. C.
101, 5 S. E. 2d 560, at page 108, the rule is clear:
In our consideration of the question, we have examined the authorities, including a number of the decisions
of other jurisdictions, and while we deem it unnecessary
to quote from them, attention is directed to annotations
found in the following volumes: 5 L. R. A., N. S., 298; 113
A. L. R., 9, 29 et seq. The provisions of most of the Statutes construed in the cases there collected were permissive
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and not mandatory as to service upon the insurance commissioner or other appointed agent, the words used being
"may" or "can" be served. These cases, with a few
exceptions, correctly hold that service under a statute of
that kind is not exclusive but cumulative. No case has
been called to our attention, however, where the statute
under construction provided that service "shall" be made
upon a designated agent, which holds that such service
is cumulative. On the contrary, the Courts are practically
uniform in holding in such cases that the method of
service designated in the Statute is exclusive, and that
service may not be had, upon any other agent of the
corporation.
The foregoing Sections have been taken only as indicative.
There are many other Sections concerning the question: Upon
whom should personal service be made? The answers can best
be found by reference to Sections 10-421 to 10-438 and their
respective annotations.
The following cases may be considered highlights in their
respective spheres: Service of process and requirements as to
proof of such service must be followed, otherwise the court
does not acquire jurisdiction: Matheson v. McCormac (1937),

186 S. C. 93, 195 S. E. 122; The provisions of the Code relating to the service of summons on foreign corporations apply
only to cases in which there is a proceeding in rem, as for example, a warrant of attachment: Tillinghast v. Boston Co.
(1893), 39 S. C. 484, 18 S. E. 120.
Before going further, it may be well to call attention to
Section 10-472, otherwise an attorney can well lose either
for himself or his client certain costs. That Section provides
no service costs are taxable against the losing party unless
the summons or any other paper mentioned in the Section
is served through the Sheriff's office in the county in which
the process is served.
Service by Publication:
Sections 10-451 to 10455 set forth the method by which
a court can acquire jurisdiction where a defendant is a nonresident or the whereabouts of a party having an interest in
real estate is unknown. The provisions of Section 10451
apply only to actions or proceedings in rem since no personal
judgment is valid if only publication of a summons must be
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used. Bush v. Aldrich (1918), 110 S. C. 491, 96 S. E. 922,
which thoroughly covers the applicability of Section 10-451,
at page 499 says:
At page 727 of 95 U. S., page 565 of 24 L. Ed., the
Court said, with respect to substituted service by pubHcation:
"Such service may also be sufficient in cases where
the object of the action is to reach and dispose of property in the State, or of some interest therein, by enforcing
a contract (italics added), or lien respecting the same,
or to partition it among different owners, or, when the
public is a party, to condemn and appropriate it for a
public purpose. In other words, such service may answer
in all actions which are substantially proceedings in
rem."
Again on the same page:
"Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes: First
as against the person of the defendant, by the service
of process; or secondly, by a procedure against the

property of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the
Court. In the latter case the defendant is not personally
bound by the judgment beyond the property in question.
And it is immaterial whether the proceeding against the
property be by an attachment or bill in chancery. It
must be, substantially, a proceeding in rem. A bill for
the specific execution of a contract to convey real estate
is not strictly a proceeding in rem in ordinary cases; but
where such a procedure is authorized by statute, on publication, without personal service of process, it is substantially of that character."
See also Pennoyer v. Neff (1878), 5 (U. S.) Otto 714-748,
and Dyer v. Georgia Power Go. (1934), 173 S. C. 518, 176
S. E. 711, for various angles of this process problem. See also
Riker v. Vaughan, under the next subdivision.
Infants,Service of Process Upon:
Whether an infant, or minor, is a resident or a nonresident,
the requirements of Section 10-434 or 10-451 must be strictly
followed. As said in Finley v. Robertson (1882), 17 S. C.
435, at page 439:
The mode of making infants parties to an action in a
court of record is clearly and expressly prescribed by
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statute, and a due and tender regard for the rights and

welfare of infants requires that this statute shall be
strictly followed.
And Riker v. Vaughan (1885), 23 S. C. 187 goes into a detailed explanation on page 189 as follows:
This being the only mode provided by statute by which
a nonresident minor can be made a party defendant to an
action, the only question is whether this mode has been
"strictly followed." It is quite clear that it has not.
The statute, as one alternative, prescribes three things
to be done: 1. The procuring of an order for service by
publication. 2. The actual publication; and, 3. The deposit
in the post-office of a copy of the summons, addressed
to the person to be served, at his place of residence. And
as the other alternative, two things: 1. The procuring
of an order for service by publication. 2. Personal service
of the summons out of the State. It is conceded in this
case that no order for service by publication was ever
obtained, and therefore the first requirement under
either of the alternatives above presented has not been
complied with. It may be ihat it is difficult to see any
practical benefit to be derived from the order permitting
service by publication, yet as the statute expressly requires it, we do not see by what authority we can dispense with that, any more than with any other requirement. So that, even if it should be conceded that the
endorsement on the summons signed by the minor, taken
in connection with the statement in his petition that the
"case had been begun by service of summons upon petitioner," amounted to an acceptance or acknowledgment

of service, and as such, equivalent to personal service,
there would still be a fatal defect in the failure to obtain
an order that the service might be made by publication,
for the statute only provides that personal service out
of the State shall be sufficient "where publication is
ordered."
Amendment of Summons or Proof of Service:
This can be done only under an order of court. Section
10-409. As to the proper method of amending a summons one
finds the following to be the rule as laid down in Arthur v.
Allen (1884), 22 S. C. 432, beginning at page 441:
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....
It may be conceded that a summons cannot be
amended without leave of the court, and the practical
inquiry here is, has such leave been granted? The order
of Judge Hudson was, "That James 0. F. Sims be made
a party defendant herein; that the plaintiff have leave
within twenty days from the rising of the court to amend
his complaint by alleging," &c. Now, if it be true, as it
undoubtedly is, that the proper mode of making a party
defendant to a case is by the service of a summons upon
him, it would seem to follow necessarily that where there
is an order requiring a certain person to be made a party
defendant, such order implies that the summons in the
case is to be amended by inserting his name and serving
a copy thereof so amended upon such person .....
.... It is true that the amendment of the summons was
not made by inserting the name of the additional party
authorized in the summons first issued, with an appropriate reference to the order authorizing such an amendment, as perhaps would have been the better practice,
inasmuch as the rule seems to be well settled that there
can be but one original summons in a case, and that
instead thereof a transcript of such original summons
was made in which the name of Sims was added as an
additional defendant, and was styled "amendment to supplemental summons and complaint, making J. C. F. Sims
a party defendant," and marked "original"; but this
departure from what would have been a better practice
is merely formal and cannot have the effect of annulling
the paper. It appears to us, therefore, that the summons
was substantially amended, and that this was done by
virtue of an order which necessarily implied leave to
make such amendment.....
Proof of Service:
Some of the cases heretofore cited also cover certain aspects
of this topic, but at this juncture a careful analysis of Sections
10-404 to 10-409, with their respective annotations, is suggested.
A sheriff's return of personal service or an affidavit of
service by a deputy is only prima facie evidence. Laurens
Trust Co. v. Copeland (1930), 154 S. C. 390, 151 S. E. 617.
As said at page 397:
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.... It is true that the affidavit of service, purporting
to have been signed by the deputy sheriff, L. F. Nabors,
shows upon its face that she was personally served on
December 4, 1924. The return of this officer is only
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, but this
affidavit of service has been impeached by extrinsic evidence, and the proof of its falsity has been clearly and
convincingly established.
.... There is nothing in this case to bring it within the
rule laid down in the cases of Dill-Ball Co. v. Bailey, 103
S. C., 233, 87 S. E., 1010, and MetropolitanLife Insurance
Co. v. Still et al., 140 S. C., 18, 138 S. E., 401, where this
Court held that, while the service in those cases was not
altogether regular, yet the parties were fully informed
of the pendency of those actions. In those cases copies
of the summons and complaint were left in mail boxes at
the respective residences of the parties, and the testimony
showed that they got the papers in their possession, and
the Court very properly held that they were informed of
the action pending against them, and that this was suffi-

cient to show service and a substantial compliance with
the law. In the present case, there is no evidence whatever that copies of the summons and complaint were
served in any manner upon Mrs. Copeland, or that she
ever had any "notice of the pendency of the action against
her, unless the return of the deputy sheriff in the record
is to be taken as evidence thereof. If you disregard the
return of the deputy sheriff, which we hold should be
done, for the reason that the presumption of its correctinless has been entirely overcome and rebutted by the
uncontradicted extrinsic evidence of its falsity, then there
is not a particle of testimony remaining in the record to
sustain the findings of the Circuit Judge .....
As we have learned heretofore absence of proof of service
is not conclusive that no service was made; indeed, where the
record shows no proof of service at all and no compliance
with Section 10-407, and a judgment has been obtained, every
necessary presumption will be invoked to sustain the judgment. Coogler v. Crosby (1911), 89 S. C. 508, 72 S. E. 149,
and Abraham 'v. N. Y. UnderwritersIns. Co. (1938), 187 S. C.
70, 196 S. E. 531.
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Cannon v. Haverty Furniture Co. (1935), 179 S. C. 1,
183 S. E. 469, gave the writer as a young county judge what
was probably a much needed lesson on this subject. Though
the Court was divided in opinion, the decision is rather replete
with authorities and comprehensively covers what is proper
proof of service. As to whether or not service is defective
one finds on page 13:
In connection with what we have stated above, we wish
to state, further, that, when the proof of service shows
on its face that the service in question is defective, that
service was not acquired, the orders and acts of the Court
based thereon are void. In the case at bar the paper purporting to be the proof of service on Cannon in the first
action does not, for the reasons we have pointed out,
show complete service. Therefore the order of arrest was
without authority of law and the imprisonment unlawful.
As shown above, the purported proof of service on Cannon, intended to be made by substitution, does not show
that the party with whom the summons and complaint
was left was or is a person of discretion; it does not show
that Cannon was at the time in question a resident at the
place the said summons and complaint is said to have
been left, and does not show that Cannon stayed at
that place. In our opinion, it was not proper to supply
this information, after the order and judgment in question were given and after the arrest of Cannon and his
subsequent imprisonment thereunder, for the purpose of
rendering the judgment against" Cannon in the first action voidable instead of void. The certificate of service,
that is the certificate purporting to show service, .cannot
be supplemented for this purpose. Further, the certificate of service should have been complete within itself
in order to give authorityfor the said order of arrest and
subsequent imprisonmentthereunder.
What the proof of service must show is clearly pointed out
in Matheson v. McCormac (1937), 186 S. C. 93, 195 S. E. 122
at page 109:
The proof of service must show affirmatively that the
service of the process was correctly made. This is imperatively necessary to give the Court jurisdiction of
the person thus sought to be brought into Court. It is
not contended that in this original action, under which
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plaintiffs claim title to the property which they have
contracted to sell to C. L. McCormac and L. E. Hassinger, that Alexander J. Matheson was served as a nonresident by publication of the summons. No order of
publication was taken; no publication of the summons
was made, nor was a copy of the summons and complaint

deposited in the post office addressed to said defendant at
his last known place of residence, nor is there any showing that his place of residence was unknown to the applicant for the order of publication, nor could with reasonable diligence be ascertained.
Nor was any attempt made to obtain jurisdiction of the
rem by attachment.
The conclusion is inevitable that the Court did not
obtain jurisdiction of the defendant, Alexander J. Matheson in the action through which the plaintiffs therein
obtained title to the property they propose to convey to
C. L. McCormac and L. E. Hassinger.
Impeaching a Judgment in Equity:
It has already been noted that a judgment cannot be attacked or impeached collaterally except for lack of jurisdiction. In 1939 the Supreme Court also pointed out that such
an attack can be made by way of equity where there is proof
of fraud. It declared at page 401 in 1st CarolinasJoint Stk.
Ld. Bk. v. Knotts, 191 S. C. 384, 1 S. E. 2d 797, the rule to be
as follows:
A collateral attack upon a judgment has been defined
to be "one in an action other than that in which it was
rendered." Turner v. Malone, 24 S. C., 398; Darby & Co.
v. Shannon, 19 S. C., 526. The general rule is that a
judgment may be attacked collaterally only when its defects and infirmaties are apparent by an inspection of it.
Finley v. Robertson, 17 S. C., 435; Tederall v. Bouknight,
25 S. C., 275.
However, the case is different when fraud or collusion
is alleged. A well-recognized exception to the general
rule is found in Ruff v. Elkin, 40 S. C., 69, 18 S. E., 220,
223, where it is said that a judgment may not be impeached in an action other than that in which it was rendered, "except upon proof of fraud, or want of jurisdiction." [Authorities cited.]
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The cases of Scott v. Newell, 146 S. C., 385, 144 S. E.,
82, and Piedmont Press Ass'n. v. Record Pub. Co., 156
S. C. 43, 152 S. E., 721, likewise recognize the propriety
of an attack upon a judgment in an independent suit on
the equity side of the Court. as distinct from a collateral
or direct attack
A debtor will not be allowed to hinder, delay or defraud
his creditors by reason of a collusive and fraudulent
judgment, although the judgment may be recovered under
the deceptive guise of apparently regular judicial proceedings. In such case the creditor may show in an independent action that such judgment was procured through
fraud of the debtor or complicity of both parties, with
a design to hinder, delay, or defraud him. [Authorities
cited.]
The foregoing case involved intrinsic fraud. However, one
finds the Supreme Court holding in 1951 in Bryan v. Bryan
et al., 220 S. C. 164, 66 S. E. 2d 609, that if only intrinsic
fraud is involved there can be no impeachment, even in equity.
And there was no reference whatsoever in the decision to the
Bank case, supra. One is thus left with two inconsistent cases,
decided just about a decade apart; the earlier, laying down a
moderate and just rule; the latter, laying down a harsh and
unjust rule. One wonders how the attorneys and the Justices all overlooked the earlier case. And so, until the matter
is finally straightened out one can only settle the confusion
by applying that feeble maxim that greater regard should be
given the later decision.
Service of Papers Generally:
Sections 10-461 to 10-473 deal with service of notices and

other papers and, incidentally, with the filing of the summons
and pleadings (Section 10-470) - as to all of which the
successful trial practitioner should be familiar.
The annotations to certain of the Sections point out that
verbal notices are not sufficient. All must be in writing.
Service may be by mail, but certain requirements must be met,
as, for example, double time must be allowed. After action
has been commenced, service must then be on the attorney
and not the client. However, when the attorney's duty is ended
by obtaining execution, and a new proceeding is brought assailing the execution, service can no longer be upon him but
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must be upon the one who was his client. Duncan etc. Co. v.
Brown (1880), 15 S. C. 414; Kolb v. Jones (1881), 62 S. C.
193, 40 S. E. 168.
Filing Pleadings with Clerk, Especially Complaint:
At this point in connection with Section 10-470 and as practical sidelights in the trial process, it will be well to note that
one can seriously injure by delay his client's cause if he
doesn't follow Section 10-1101, 1952 Code, and also know Rule
26 and also Sections 10-1102 through -1106. This applies to all
counties not having a consolidated calendar, which Richland
County has. In those few counties having a consolidated calendar, Sections 10-1110 through -1121 govern and must be
followed. In those counties every step must be filed with the
Clerk "immediately after service," even notices and any "other
papers."
In every county one must not fail to file the complaint
when the issues are made up, especially in the counties not
having a consolidated calendar. This is a condition precedent
to getting a jury case on Calendar 1, so that it will in turn
go on the roster for trial. So, to properly protect a client's
rights, there must be a notation on the bcck upon which calendar the cause is to go. Circuit Rule 26 and Sections 10-1101

to 10-1102.
An instance happened in the Richland County Court which
goes to show how a client's right can either be lost or pared
down. The writer, and not the local Bar, always arranged
the jury roster from Calendar 1 as sent up by the Clerk of
Court. At the close of one such roster arranging a young
attorney came up and asked the writer why his case had not
been called; that he had attended now three meetings. He was
told that at each of those meetings every case on the Calendar
had been called. It was suggested he check in the Clerk's
office, which he did. He found the cause filed in the "Miscellaneous" box, because it wasn't marked for any of the three
calendars and the Clerk couldn't make the decision. The attorney then marked it for Calendar 1, and it got on the next
roster and was tried and his client got a small verdict in the
tort case. He told the writer afterwards that he checked with
several older trial lawyers and they told him that if his cause
had been tried in either of the two previous terms, where the
venires were rather inclined to larger verdicts, his client
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would probably have fared better. To that extent then, he
had through either ignorance or negligence caused his client,
and maybe himself, a serious loss.
In the counties using three calendars, even answers are
seldom, if ever, filed with the clerk, and although technically
motions should be filed (Section 10-1102) so as to appear
on Calendar 2 for a hearing, that is seldom, if ever, done in
those counties. However, it is advisable for a new practitioner
in any of those counties, especially any in which a Clerk of
Court is not paid a salary, to ascertain from some older attorney what is the custom in that county as to filing and
paying the fees for legal papers other than a complaint.
Now-a-days, under Section 15-233, as amended, wherein since
1925 judges have been given "all powers" at chambers except
those matters necessitating jury trials, in such counties complaints are not filed for Calendar 3 for obtaining default judgments; and the Clerk usually never hears of them until such
pleadings come to his office with the attorney's affidavit of
default and an order for judgment signed by the judge at
chambers.
It should be noted that in 1925 a judge was given "all
powers" as above mentioned. And yet again we find a glaring error in the annotations to Section 15-233 in the 1952
Code, namely, that a judge at chambers has no power to vacate or correct a judgment at chambers. None of those cases
are later than 1913, and yet "all powers" except jury trials
were given the judge years after those cases were decided.
The reader is cautioned that there are a number of such errors
running through the 1952 annotations, which call for careful
checking.
For practical purposes, especially in saving trouble in the
future for attorneys who will have to examine the court records in the Clerk's office, be sure that all backs of legal papers
indicate clearly the nature of the bradded contents on the
inside; also, be sure that each back is so typed or written
that when the papers are unfolded, they will not be upside
down. Nothing makes a judge, officer of the court, or another
attorney so out-done and also critical of an attorney as to
have such carelessness in the folding and backing of legal
papers.
There is an easy way of folding papers under Rule 12, so
as to be sure to avoid the above dilemma. Catch between
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thumb and forefinger of left hand the left top corner of paper
to be folded; fold in an equal fold so that bottom of corner
gets between the thumb and forefinger; fold again in another
equal fold in like manner; then let gravity swing papers downwards, with the thumb and forefinger acting as a pivot. The
part to be backed will be that portion facing one, and the top
will be where the thumb and forefinger are.
In spacing the matter on any back, the following should
govern:
Leave 3./4 inch space at the top and never write or type
anything in that space as it must be left for the Clerk to put
the Judgment Roll number in.

Time in Which to Answer:
Courts of record: There is but one time limit in such courts
regardless of the subject involved or the character of the cause
in any civil action. The summons "shall require the defendant
to answer" "within twenty days after the service of the
summons". Section 10-402. And the defendant must serve his
answer or demurrer within that twenty days. Section 10-641.
Even a rule to show cause issued by the chief justice, which,
when it takes the place of a summons in what is an action and
not just a proceeding will, should it require a defendant to
answer in less than 20 days, be considered a fatal jurisdictional defect. State v. Tollison (1913), 95 S. C. 58, 78 S. E.
521. See also Heyward v. Long (1935), 178 S. C. 351, 183

S. E. 145.
And the 20 day period cannot be extended except by consent or by a court order. Johnson v. Finger (1915), 102 S. C.
354, 86 S. E. 673, 61 L. Ed. 907.
Magistrate courts: Here one finds an entirely different
situation regarding the legal time limits. Instead of only one
such limitation as with courts of record, there are four different time limits in which a defendant must be given the right
to plead. Any improper variation is fatal to jurisdiction unless there be waiver. See Rosamond v. Earle (1895), 46 S. C.
9, 24 S. E. 44.
(1) As to money demand, if less than $25.00 is involved

the complaint shall be served on the defendant "not less than
5 days before the day therein fixed for trial," unless "the
justice of the case" should require a different time limit. Section 43-82. Moore v. So. Railway (1906), 76 S. C. 333, 56
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S. E. 971. Where a magistrate in a case involving $15.00 sets
the trial date less than 5 days after service of the summons,
without any cause shown therefor, and tries the case then,
the judgment is void. Paul v. So. Ry. Co. (1897), 50 S. C. 23,
27 S. E. 526. See also Cothran v. Knight (1896), 47 S. C.
243, 25 S. E. 142.
(2) Where the money demand is $25.00 or more, the complaint "shall be served on the defendant not less than 20 days"
...
. "before the day therein fixed for trial," unless "the

justice of the case" requires a different time limit. Section
43-82. The decisions already cited likewise apply here. See
Wideman v. Pruitt (1898), 52 S. C. 84, 29 S. E. 405, wherein
a requirement that a defendant appear on the 21st day after
service of the summons exclusive of the day of service was
held to be sufficient, and Able v. Hall (1915), 101 S. C. 24,
85 S. E. 165, which held that a defendant is entitled to 20
days to appear where the action is for more than $25.00, and
when the magistrate set the time at 15 days without a proper
showing, a special appearance objecting to jurisdiction did
not amount to waiver, even though such appearance was also
to vacate the attachment.
(3) As to attachments, Title 43, Vol. 4 of the Code beginning at page 637, concerning magistrates, has no sections dealing with that proceeding, as it has with regard to claim and
delivery. Hence when one seeks to attach in a magistrate
court one must go to Title 10, Chapter 10, Vol. 1 of the Code,
at page 758, where the same requirements must be met as in
a like proceeding in a circuit or county court. However, as
to the time limit for a defendant's appearance, where a delayed copy of the complaint is served pursuant to notice by
the defendant Section 10-921 must be construed in connection with Section 43-82 as is hereinafter noted.
Attachment is only a collateral proceeding to an action.
Since it is only a provisional remedy in aid of an action, the
action must be commenced in regular form. Williamson v.
Easter Bldg., etc. Ass'n. (1898), 54 S. C. 582, 597, 32 S. E.
765. See also Lester v. Fox Film Corp. (1920), 114 S. C. 414,
418; 103 S. E. 775. It would therefore seem clear that the
action, if brought in a magistrate court, must conform as to
time for appearance to Section 43-82, and that Section 10-921,

relating to "service and answer" deals only with time for appearing where a copy of the complaint, which was not served
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with the summons, is served later upon demand of the defendant.
In the latter event the defendant would be entitled to 20
days to appear for trial, and it would seem in that particular
situation that, regardless of what time had been named in the
summons for his appearance, even if less than $25.00 was involved, he would have the full 20 days. On the other hand,
one would conclude that where the summons and complaint
are served together the time limits in, and the cases cited
under, Section 43-82 would apply to the action as distinguished from the attachment proceedings. Particular attention is called to Able v. Hall, supra,which involved an attachment in a magistrate court.
(4) With regard to claim and delivery, as already indicated,
specific sections of the Code deal with that proceeding in a
magistrate court. Sections 43-171 to 43-184. One will find
some of the requirements therein and rights of litigants there-

under different from those in the Sections providing for such
a proceeding in a circuit or a county court, namely Sections
10-2501 to 10-2516. One such important difference is that
in such a proceeding in a circuit or county court one "may at
the time of issuing the summons or at any time before answer
claim the immediate delivery of such property." Section
10-2501; whereas in a magistrate court the plaintiff may
make such claim "at the time of issuing the summons, but not
afterwards." Therefore the plaintiff's attorney must carefully consider what to do at the time the summons is issued.
It will be too late to do later what could have best protected
a client's right if done earlier.
Here again one is faced with another time limit problem,
when Section 43-173 is compared with Section 43-82. The former Section provides that upon receipt of the necessary affidavit and undertaking, the "magistrate shall endorse upon
the affidavit a direction to any constable of the county requiring a taking of the property claimed by the plaintiff."
At this stage of the proceeding it is important to note that
Section 43-173 continues by providing that "the magistrate
shall at the same time issue a summons" requiring the defendant to appear "not more than 20 days from the date thereof,
to answer the complaint of the plaintiff". Thus it would
clearly appear that in a claim and delivery proceeding, the
necessary action in conjunction therewith must meet the pro-
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cess requirements of Section 43-173 and not of Section 43-82,
even if the amount involved in the action is less than $25.00.
In Simmons v. Cochran (1888), 29 S. C. 31, 6 S. E. 859,
which involved claim and delivery, it was declared at page 33:
Did the trial justice have jurisdiction? is the first
question. The code provides in such cases, that the trial
justice shall issue a summons directed to the defendant,
requiring him to appear and answer, at a time and place
to be therein specified, and not more than twenty days
from the date thereof. It appears that both of the trial
justices failed to observe this provision of the code; the
time fixed in the summons of each was beyond twenty
days from the date of issue. This appears on the face of
the proceedings. Why the general assembly thought
proper to enact such an unqualified requirement in such
cases, is not for this court to consider. It is so written
in the statute book, and the language seems imperative not more than twenty days. The summons is the paper
which gives jurisdiction to the court over the person of
the party brought in; and where the law has provided a
special mode or character of said summons, either as to
service, form, or otherwise, involuntary jurisdiction cannot be acquired without a compliance with said law. And
especially is this so in all statutory proceedings and
remedies.
If a trial justice had the right to disregard the act as to
the time fixed in the summons, for a day, or for three
days, as in the summons here, why could he not also for
a month, or a year? Who could interfere with his discretion? True, this seems a small matter in the case be.fore us; but it is important that the forms of law and
requirements of the statutes in reference to the administration of the law should be observed. This is best for
all in the long run, although hardships may sometimes
occur by a strict adherence to such requirements.
Kelly v. Kennemore and Barrv. Kennemore (1896), 47 S. C.
256, 25 S. E. 134, likewise involving claim and delivery, were
cases where the magistrate fixed the trial date, or date of
appearance, less than 20 days after the date of the summons;
the time in the Barrcase being 19 days. Justice Pope, writing
the court's opinion, held that, under what is now Section
43-173 the magistrate acquired jurisdiction.
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Justice McIver in his concurring opinion went thoroughly
into the legal background on pages 261, 262:
...The question presented, as I understand it, is, whether
the trial justice had jurisdiction of the cases. The denial of
such jurisdiction seems to be based solely upon the
grounds: that neither of the defendants had received such
notice of the time of trial as is required by statute. There
are two separate and distinct provisions in the Code
upon the subject; one found in subdivision 12, of section
71, manifestly applicable to actions of claim and delivery
only, and the other in subdivision 16, of section 88, of the
Code, which seems to be applicable to actions for the recovery of money. In the former the provision is that, the

trial justice shall issue a summons, directed to the defendant, "requiring him to appear before said trial justice, at
a time and place to be therein specified, and not more than
twenty days from the date thereof, to answer the complaint of said plaintiff." But, in the other section of the
Code above referred to, ... the provision is as follows:
"When twenty-five or more dollars is demanded, the complaint be served on the defendant not less than twenty
days, and where less than that sum is demanded, not
less than five days before the day therein fixed for trial."
So that, in actions in a trial justice court, for claim and
delivery of personal property, the Code requires that the
time specified in the summons for trial shall be "not
more than twenty days from the date thereof" - the
summons; while in actions for the recovery of money
in a trial justice court, "where $25 or more is demanded,"
the requirement is that, "the complaint shall be served on
the defendant not less than twenty days * * * before the
day therein fixed for trial." If, therefore, these actions
should be regarded as actions for claim and delivery, as I
think they must be, then the requirement of the statute
has been complied with, if the day fixed for trial was
"not more than twenty days" from the date of the summons, aid the jurisdictional objection is without foundation. Now, in the first case, the date of the summons,
as it appears in the "Case," was the 26th day of February,
1895, which it was conceeded [sic] at the hearing was a

misprint, January being the true date, and the day fixed
for the trial was the 14th of February, 1895, which was
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clearly within the twenty days limit; and, in the second
case, the date of the summons, as it appears in the
"Case", was 28th of January, 1895, and the day fixed for
the trial of that case was the 15th of February, 1895,
which was likewise clearly within the twenty days limit.
None of the cases which have been cited have any application to the question presented here. In Simmons v.
Cochran, 29 S. C., 31, the time fixed for the trial exceeded the twenty days limit, and, hence, the statutory
requirement not having been complied with, it was properly held that the trial justice had no jurisdiction. In

Adkins v. Moore, 43 S. C., 173, the action was notfor
claim and delivery, but for the recovery of money, and,
hence, it was very properly held by Mr. Justice Gary that
the defendant not having received the notice as required
by the statute, the full twenty days, the trial justice had
no jurisdiction. In Rosamond v. Earle, 46 S. C., 9, the
Court held that the defendant, having voluntarily appeared and pleaded to the merits, had waived any objection as to due notice of the trial ....
It would further appear that, regardless of the amount involved, the leeway given a magistrate by Section 43-82, to
name at his discretion, a lesser time for appearance upon
proper cause being shown is not applicable. However, under
Section 43-173 the phrase "not more than 20 days" gives the
magistrate similar leeway without any requirement that
"good reason" 1- shown by way of affidavit. Of course, in his
judicial discretion it would seem that he can shorten the time,
depending on the circumstances of the situation before him.
It should be noted in passing that the case of Adkins v.
Moore (1895), 43 S. C. 173, 20 S. E. 985, should not be annotated under Section 43-173, since it was not concerned with
claim and delivery as Justice McIver pointed out in his concurring opinion in the Kelly case, supra, but involved only a
money demand, as is also indicated by its being annotated
under Section 43-82.
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CONTINUANCES
That a trial attorney should thoroughly familiarize himself
with the rules pertaining to the tribunal before which his
client's case is to be tried is aptly illustrated by the decisions
involving continuances and therefore circuit court Rule 27.
The civil case of King v. Smith (1928), 148 S. C. 419, 146
S. E. 237, makes this clear besides setting forth the common

law principles applicable to continuances.
At page 424 it is stated:
We have given the reasons advanced in this cause for
the desired continuance careful attention. We are impressed, too, that the kind-hearted circuit Judge gave
them his most earnest consideration. It is evident that
he desired to show every possible courtesy both to the
excellent and highly ethical member of the bar who was
undergoing affliction and his client. But he was confronted with a plaintiff, a young school teacher, injured almost unto death, with possibly, it seemed then,
only a few weeks to live, seeking recovery of damages
for the injuries he had sustained from the man whose
negligence he charged had brought him to his unfortunate situation. Pleading that the sound discretion of the
Court be exercised in their respective favors were an ill
lawyer of a litigant on the one hand and almost a dying
litigant on the other.
No such situation, or one in any way quite similar
to it, has been discovered by us in an exhaustive search
of our reported cases.
And at page 426:
...
However anxious the defendant may have been to
have present at the trial his leading counsel, Capt. Mauldin, it must be taken into consideration that the junior
member of the firm, Mr. Love, has been for several years
a trial lawyer of great experience, and highly regarded
as a practitioner of much ability, and that he had associated with him Mr. Sullivan, of the Anderson bar, who
likewise stands very high in the profession of the law.

With these two attorneys to represent him, the defendant
had the benefit of able counsel, well prepared to see
that his defense was properly presented to the Court.
The main purpose of our Court procedure is to see, first,
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that litigants have a fair and impartial trial; the next
is to give those demanding it as speedy a trial as possible.
Rule 27 of the circuit Court provides that a party
seeking for a continuance, in addition to showing that
due diligence was exercised by him to procure the attendance of an absent witness, must also set forth, under
oath, the fact or facts he believes the witness, if present,
would testify to, and the grounds of that belief. It does

not appear that the defendant complied with this rule
when he sought a continuance on account of the absence
of Miss Burriss and Mrs. Little. It is doubtful, too, if he
exercised due diligence in procuring the attendance of
the desired witnesses. The record does not show when
Miss Burriss and Mrs. Little left Anderson, the one for
Europe and the other for Atlanta. The defendant was
served with the summons and complaint some time on
[sic] April. No effort was made to subpoena the ladies
until the week of June 20th, when the case was to be tried.
It appears also that it is likely Mrs. Tribble gave the
same testimony which the defendant wished to offer
through the absent witnesses.
Again at page 427 this summation followed:
This is a hard case, we admit; just as the circuit Judge
admitted it was hard. He exercised his discretion as he
thought best under all the circumstances. This Court is
unable to declare from the record and all the surrounding
circumstances, of which Judge Bonham was in better position to judge than we are, that he abused the discretion
allowed him under the law.
State v. Hutto (1903), 66 S. C. 449, 45 S. E. 13, gives one
the criminal angle, and also applies Rule 27 (then Rule 28).
As pointed out by Chief Justice Pope, abiding by Rule 27 is
not in itself sufficient. The moving party must have its witness under a recognizance bond in a criminal case. The opinion at page 450 declares:
The matter of continuance of causes is vested by law

in the discretion of the presiding Judge. However, if the
Circuit Judge should abuse his discretion, this Court
would interfere. Was there any abuse of discretion in
this instance? We think not, for the following reasons:
Experience has established the fact that it is seldom

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss5/9

24

1959]

Whaley: Service of Process
HANDBOOK OF TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

41

the case that all the witnesses either for the prosecution

or the defense are present to testify at the trial. To secure
the presence of such witnesses, the law very generously gives both sides to the controversy the right to
have ther witnesses, respectively, arrested to give bond
for attendance at Court. In the instance at bar, the defendant did not pursue this course, but relied upon the
service of subpoena tickets upon his witnesses. This is
one reason for the denial of the motion to continue.
Again, under Rule XXVIII., a party applying for a continuance shall by affidavit set forth the materiality of the
testimony of the absent witnesses to support the defense;
that the motion is not intended for delay, but is made
solely because he cannot safely go to trial without such
testimony; that he has made use of due diligence to procure the testimony of the witness; and that the witness, if
present, he believes, would testify to certain fact or facts
set out in the affidavit, and the grounds of such belief.
The last provision of this rule is intended to advise the
adverse party of such fact or facts, so that such adverse
party may or may not admit the same. If such adverse
party admits that if such witness would, if present, testify to such fact or facts, then the trial may go forward.
Such was the admission of the solicitor in the case at bar.
Hence there was no error by the Circuit Judge in this
case.
Even where a witness is under a recognizance bond, Rule 27

must be complied with, except the provision therein requiring
one to have a subpoena issued, since doing so would then
seem to be unnecessary. It would also seem that, where a
witness is so seriously sick as to have her life endangered
if she were brought into court, a recognizance bond would not
be required and certainly a bench warrant would not be used.
State v. Waring (1917), 109 S. C. 52, 95 S. E. 143. See also
State v. Hiers (1917), 107 S. C. 411, 93 S. E. 124.
The later case of State v. Gilstrap (1944), 205 S. C. 412, 32
S. E. 2d 163, shows that where a motion for a continuance,
with all the necessary conditions precedent complied with, has
not been made, or if it has been made but would have to be
refused because of a lack of at least one of such conditions,
a trial attorney, either through negligence or ignorance, may
seriously injure his client's case. In the Gilstrap case the
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defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that an expert witness "failed at the last moment to attend the trial".
The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion said at page 421:
This witness, although he had promised counsel for the
defendant to attend and testify, was not subpoenaed. Nor
was the Court requested to issue any process to procure
his attendance. Nor was a recess or a continuance asked;
nor was any affidavit submitted under Rule 27 of the
Circuit Court showing what the witness would swear to
if present. The defendant when on the stand testified
that he was entirely sane when he made the attack upon
the little girl; that he knew it was wrong, and that immediately thereafter he attempted to blot out the horror
of it by resorting to the drinking of liquor. Under the
foregoing circumstances, we see no merit in the exception
raising this question.
Consolidation of Cases: As pointed out in McKinney v.
Greenville Ice & Fuel Co. (1958), S. C. -- , 101 S. E. 2d
659, 660:
[1] In Kennedy v. Empire State Underwriters of Watertown, N. Y., 202 S.C. 38, 24 S.E. 2d 78, we pointed out
the distinction between true consolidation of cases and
their trial together for convenience, to wit: that in true
consolidation the several actions are combined into one,
losing their separate identity and becoming a single action in which a single judgment is rendered; whereas if
they are simply tried together for convenience or, as
it is sometimes said, "consolidated for trial", they do not

merge into one, but each remains separate in all procedural matters other than the joint trial.
[2] Only where the parties are identical and the causes
of action such as may have been united in the same
complaint under Section 10-701 of the 1952 Code may
the Court, in its discretion, order consolidation over objection of either party. [Cases Cited]
[3] Where the parties are not the same, several cases
may, by their consent, but not otherwise, be tried together for convenience. [Cases Cited.]
[4] "Where a personal tort has been done to a number
of individuals, but no joint injury has been suffered and
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no joint damages sustained in consequence thereof, the
interest and right are necessarily several, and each of
the injured parties must maintain a separate action for
his own personal redress." Pomeroy, Code Remedies,
4th Ed., Section 148.
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